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市场监管、大股东侵害与投票权非完备性
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Abstract: From the Game Model, the article first tries to prove that it exists in any stock
market the probability of the infringement of the major shareholders on medium-sized and small shareholders. On this basis, we unveil the major shareholders’ voting rights is incomplete in Chinese listed companies, and based on this, the paper proves that the best choice for major shareholders is to maximize their hand voting rights--that is to infringe upon medium-sized and small shareholders. The research of this thesis indicates that solve the problem of the major shareholders’ infringement should change the game rule.
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